Pregnancy, Personhood, and the Equality of Women
Pregnancy presents a serious challenge to our approach to personhood and equality in philosophy and in law. We normally think that “one equals one”: each person is equal to each other person. But in pregnancy we do not clearly have “one” person. As Barbara Katz Rothman writes, “[t]he isolated, atomistic individual is an absurdity when one is pregnant: one is two, two are one.” This presentation will take this observation seriously, and build upon an article written by the speaker, where she made a new argument on pregnancy and personhood. While we have debated at length the moral status or personhood of the fetus, the presentation will examine a different question entirely: the personhood of the person who is pregnant. If we think that pregnancy is a unique form of bodily existence, there are reasons to recognise that a pregnant woman has a unique form of personhood, and further, we may think that this is a category of personhood that calls for a stronger set of rights. The presentation will also consider a range of practical and legal implications of the argument, including in relation to the equality of women, and will include discussion of some of the speaker’s current work on the subject.
Pre-reading: https://jme.bmj.com/content/50/1/12
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