David Enoch
Biography
David Enoch does primarily moral, political, and legal philosophy.
David studied law and philosophy at Tel Aviv University, then clerked for Justice Beinisch at the Israeli Supreme Court. He pursued a PhD in philosophy at NYU (2003), and has been a faculty member at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem ever since, on a joint appointment in philosophy and law. He started at Oxford as the Professor of the Philosophy of Law in 2023.
David published work in metaethics (where he defends a robust, non-naturalistic kind of moral realism), in the philosophy of law (where he criticizes some versions of "general jurisprudence", discusses moral and legal luck, and analyses the role of statistical evidence), in political philosophy (where he criticizes Rawlsian, public-reason liberalism, discusses false consciousness, and nudging), in ethics (where he discusses the status of hypothetical consent, and rejects the existence of moral luck), and more.
Publications
ENOCH D, ‘Contrastive Consent and Third-Party Coercion’ [2024] The Philosophers’ Imprint
ENOCH D, ‘How Nudging Upsets Autonomy’ [2024] The Journal of Philosophy
Enoch D, ‘There is Nothing Tort Law is About: Comment on Goldberg and Zipursky’s Recognizing Wrongs’ (2023) 27(1) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 24
Enoch D, ‘Autonomy as Non‐alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics*’ (2022) 30(2) Political Philosophy 143
Enoch D and Spectre L, ‘Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone’ (2021) 199(3-4) Synthese 5687
Enoch D, Fisher T and Spectre L, ‘Does legal epistemology rest on a mistake? On fetishism, two‐tier system design, and conscientious fact‐finding’ (2021) 31(1) Philosophical Issues 85
Enoch D, ‘Just because it’s a phobia doesn’t mean you shouldn’t be afraid’ (2021) 178(7) Philosophical Studies 2425
Enoch D, ‘Correction to: Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable’ (2021) 178(7) Philosophical Studies 2357
Enoch D, ‘Thanks, We’re good: why moral realism is not morally objectionable’ (2021) 178(5) Philosophical Studies 1689
Enoch D, ‘False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences’ (2020) 129(2) The Philosophical Review 159
Enoch D, ‘’No, actually your life is going considerably worse’: a comment on Nir Eyal.’ (2020) 7(1) Journal of Law and the Biosciences lsaa046
Enoch D, ‘Playing the Hand You’re Dealt’ (2019) 43(1) Midwest Studies in Philosophy 257
Enoch D and Spectre L, ‘SENSITIVITY, SAFETY, AND THE LAW: A REPLY TO PARDO’ (2019) 25(3) Legal Theory 178
Enoch D, ‘Impartiality and Realism: Reply to Mancuso’ (2018) 37(4) Topoi 603
Enoch D, ‘Against utopianism: Noncompliance and multiple agents’ (2018) 18(16) Philosophers Imprint
Enoch D, ‘IN DEFENSE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHTS (OR ANYWAY, PROCEDURAL DUTIES): A RESPONSE TO WELLMAN’ (2018) 24(1) Legal Theory 40
Enoch D, ‘Hypothetical Consent and the Value(s) of Autonomy’ (2017) 128(1) Ethics 6
Enoch D, ‘The masses and the elites: political philosophy for the age of Brexit, Trump and Netanyahu’ (2017) 8(1) Jurisprudence 1
Enoch D and McPherson T, ‘What do you mean “This isn’t the question”?’ (2017) 47(6) Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1
Enoch D, ‘II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action’ (2016) 116(1) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 21
Enoch D and Fisher T, ‘Sense and “sensitivity”: Epistemic and instrumental approaches to statistical evidence’ (2015) 67(3) Stanford Law Review 557
Enoch D, ‘Authority and Reason‐Giving1’ (2014) 89(2) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 296
Enoch D, ‘Précis of Taking Morality Seriously (Oxford University Press, 2011)’ (2014) 168(3) Philosophical Studies 819
Enoch D, ‘In defense of Taking Morality Seriously: reply to Manne, Sobel, Lenman, and Joyce’ (2014) 168(3) Philosophical Studies 853
Enoch D, ‘On Analogies, Disanalogies, and Moral Philosophy: A Comment on John Mikhail’s Elements of Moral Cognition’ (2013) 8(1) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 1
Enoch D, ‘The Disorder of Public Reason’ (2013) 124(1) Ethics 141
Enoch D, ‘Comment on Yaffe’s Attempts’ (2012) 6(1) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 20
ENOCH D, SPECTRE L and FISHER T, ‘Statistical Evidence, Sensitivity, and the Legal Value of Knowledge’ (2012) 40(3) Philosophy &Amp Public Affairs 197
Enoch D, ‘On Mark Schroeder’s Hypotheticalism: A Critical Notice of Slaves of the Passions’ (2011) 120(3) The Philosophical Review 423
Enoch D, ‘Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement’ (2010) 119(476) Mind 953
Enoch D, ‘The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it’ (2010) 148(3) Philosophical Studies 413
Enoch D, ‘Moral Luck and the Law’ (2010) 5(1) Philosophy Compass 42
Enoch D, ‘Can there be a global, interesting, coherent constructivism about practical reason?’ (2009) 12(3) Philosophical Explorations 319
ENOCH D, ‘Wouldn’t It Be Nice If p, Therefore, p (for a moral p)’ (2009) 21(2) Utilitas 222
Enoch D, ‘How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?’ (2009) 13(1) The Journal of Ethics 15
ENOCH D and SCHECHTER J, ‘How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified?’ (2008) 76(3) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 547
Enoch D and Marmor A, ‘The Case Against Moral Luck’ (2007) 26(4) Law and Philosophy 405
Enoch D, ‘INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE*’ (2007) 13(2) Legal Theory 69
Enoch D, ‘Epistemicism and Nihilism about Vagueness: What’s the Difference?’ (2007) 133(2) Philosophical Studies 285
Schechter J and Enoch D, ‘Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens’ (2006) 40(4) Noûs 687
Enoch D, ‘Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won’t Come from What Is Constitutive of Action’ (2006) 115(2) The Philosophical Review 169
Enoch D, ‘Taking Disagreement Seriously: On Jeremy Waldron’s <span class="italic">Law and Disagreement</span>’ (2006) 39(3) Israel Law Review 22
Enoch D, ‘Why Idealize?’ (2005) 115(4) Ethics 759
Enoch D, ‘How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking’ (2003) 41(4) The Southern Journal of Philosophy 527
Enoch D, ‘A Right to Violate One’s Duty’ (2002) 21(4-5) Law and Philosophy 355
Enoch D, ‘Some Arguments Against Conscientious Objection and Civil Disobedience Refuted’ (2002) 36(3) Israel Law Review 227
Enoch D, ‘Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson’ (2001) 14(2) Ratio 185
Enoch D, ‘Ends, Means, Side-Effects, and Beyond: A Comment on the Justification of the Use of Force’ 7(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 43
Enoch D, ‘Whose Right Is It? Reflections on Harel’s Reflections on Palestinians’ Interest in Return’ 5(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 367
Enoch D, ‘Luck Between Morality, Law, and Justice’ 9(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 23
Aboodi R, Borer A and Enoch D, ‘Deontology, Individualism, and Uncertainty’ 105(5) The Journal of Philosophy 259
Guttel E and Enoch D, ‘Cognitive Biases and Moral Luck’ 7(3) Journal of Moral Philosophy 372
Liron A and Enoch D, ‘The Case for Voting to Change the Outcomes Is Weaker Than It May Seem: A Reply to Zach Barnett’ 26(1) Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Enoch D, ‘Politics and suffering’ Analytic Philosophy
Enoch D, ‘A Defense of Moral Deference’ 111(5) The Journal of Philosophy 229
ENOCH D, ‘Revisiting Raz on Autonomy’ in Brownlee, D ENOCH and Marmor (eds.), Engaging Raz (2024)
ENOCH D, ‘Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! Or: Why Care about Morality, Robustly Realistically Understood’ in P Bloomfield and D Copp (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism (Oxford Univesity Press 2023)
Enoch D, ‘Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?’, Dimensions of Normativity (Oxford University Press (OUP) 2019)
Enoch D, ‘Being Responsible, Taking Responsibility, and Penumbral Agency’, Luck, Value, and Commitment (Oxford University Press (OUP) 2012)
Enoch D, ‘Reason-Giving and the Law’, Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law (2011)
Enoch D, ‘Shmagency Revisited’, New Waves in Metaethics (Springer Nature 2011)
Enoch D, Fisher T and Spectre L, ‘Does Legal Epistemology Rest on a Mistake? On Fetishism, Two-Tier System Design, and Conscientious Fact-Finding’
Enoch D, ‘Autonomy as Non-Alienation, Autonomy as Sovereignty, and Politics’
Enoch D, ‘False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences’
Enoch D, ‘How to Theorize about Statistical Evidence (and Really, about Everything Else): A comment on Allen’
Enoch D, ‘Playing the Hand You’re Dealt: How Moral Luck Is Different from Morally Significant Plain Luck (And Probably Doesn’t Exist)’
Enoch D, ‘Just Because It’s a Phobia Doesn’t Mean You Shouldn’t Be Afraid’
Enoch D, ‘Constitutivism: On Rabbits, Hats, and Holy Grails’
Enoch D and Spectre L, ‘Sensitivity, Safety, and the Law: A Reply to Pardo’
Enoch D, ‘The Masses and the Elites: Political Philosophy for the Age of Brexit, Trump & Netanyahu’
Enoch D, ‘The Disorder of Public Reason’
Enoch D, ‘A Defense of Moral Deference’
Enoch D, ‘Political Philosophy and Epistemology: The Case of Public Reason’
Enoch D, ‘A Comment on Yaffe’s Attempts’
Enoch D, ‘Against Public Reason’
Enoch D, ‘Is General Jurisprudence Interesting?’
Enoch D and Marmor A, ‘The Case Against Moral Luck’