RESITUATING FULLER
Wednesday 9 Feb 2011, 17.30-19.30 (preceded by drinks at 17.00)
Lon L. Fullers account of legality is widely accepted as the classic twentieth century statement of the principles of the rule of law. Yet his own argument that a necessary connection between law and morality manifests in the form of law is not generally accepted, and his legal theory continues to occupy a marginal place in the field of legal philosophy. In her forthcoming book, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the jurisprudence of Lon L. Fuller, Kristen Rundle makes a case for the inner coherence of Fullers jurisprudence by illuminating how his insistence on the connection between law and morality finds its foundation in the claim that the form of law, in its connection to the agency of the legal subject, introduces meaningful limits to lawgiving power. Having reclaimed this reading of Fuller from his published writings as well as from archival material, the book's final chapter (the paper under discussion) turns to ask how that reading might be situated within the landscape of contemporary legal philosophy, referring primarily to the jurisprudence of Joseph Raz and Ronald Dworkin. (This event is kindly supported by Hart Publishing)