Conor Casey - 'An Alternative Method for Interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights'

We will have the pleasure of welcoming Conor Casey (Surrey), whose presentation is titled 'The Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice Option: An Alternative Method for Interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights.'

Here is an abstract of the paper:

'This essay makes the case for an alternative approach to the interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention), one rooted in the classical natural law tradition. The foundation of my alternative approach is built on a reconstruction of the jurisprudence of one of the European Court of Human Right’s (the Court) most heterodox judges – Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, who was the United Kingdom’s nominated judge between 1974-1980. In his dissents, concurrences, and writings, I argue, are the conceptual and normative seeds from which a more promising approach to interpreting the Convention can be grown.

My alternative approach does not represent a repudiation of the moral purpose or point of the Convention but is in keeping with one of the principal moral impetus’ behind its creation: the desire to protect the most basic and fundamental human rights that are owed as a matter of justice to all persons.  I also suggest this alternative method would, if adopted, deflate a great deal of the legal and political critique directed toward the Court.

My arguments are largely directed toward those that are critical of the Court and its current methodological approach. The primary aim of this essay is to offer an interpretative method I consider sound and morally valuable. But I also have a secondary aim, which is to offer a third way for those critical of how the Convention is being interpreted and who think there are only two, quite stark, options available to them:  either to grudgingly accept the continued use of interpretative methods they consider of dubious legitimacy, or to denounce the Convention in its entirety and risk serious diplomatic and political consequences. I accept, then, that for those who are deeply committed to the Court’s current approach, and who see it as central to the sound functioning of the Convention, my arguments will have less to offer.'